

24 July 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. This is a brief of the executive session of USIB that took place Wednesday, 22 July, at 11:50. Present were the regular members of USIB, plus Dr. McMillan of NRO, who is a member, for NRO matters, of USIB, and Dr. Fubini, who appeared at the request of Mr. McCone, because Dr. Fubini represents Secretary Vance and Mr. McNamara on NRO matters, and the responsibility for NRO is shared equally by DCI and the Secretary of Defense. I make a point of this because it explains why they were there and why the Director did not bring in his opposite member, the monitor of NRO, Dr. Wheelon, or why he did not have John Bross, or [redacted] or someone else. This was the membership. So the only true outsider was Fubini. Mr. McCone mentioned both of these points prior to making his opening remarks. He said the question that he was faced with was the establishment of requirements for overhead reconnaissance, and by requirements he referred not alone to targets that had to be covered, but the degree of resolution, and accordingly, therefore, the swath width, since they were related, and he felt that the U. S. Intelligence Board had perhaps been derelict in its duties over the years in not making these requirements clearly understood by the NRO or by other collection agencies. He said that in June of 1960, USIB had gone to the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum -- and I think he quoted the subject, "Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance." It was an old paper. It was two months after the shootdown of the U-2, but was prior to the collection of any satellite reconnaissance. And he quoted from this paper, indicating that the requirement existed for a photographic system capable of object resolution of [redacted] on a side; however, the 100-foot resolution -- and apparently that was then a concept in satellite reconnaissance -- would be utilized to the maximum extent possible. Mr. McCone pointed out that subsequently he had been concerned about this whole problem, even without the knowledge of this letter, and that in April of '63, USIB had considered updating the requirements on NRO and had asked COMOR to review these requirements and to establish a new set, providing to USIB the guidance which the DCI and Sec Def could then give to NRO, and that at that time that the paper should be discussed and coordinated and at least talked over with the NRO. Mr. McCone pointed out that COMOR did this, and submitted the paper to <sup>USIB</sup> COMOR, I presume, in April, and that in September of 1963, NRO expressed a number of reservations on the paper -- not back to USIB, apparently, but perhaps to COMOR. In any event, all this is what Mr. McCone said at the meeting.

2. At this point, then, Kiefer, acting for McMillan - and I am still quoting Mr. McCone -- got together with COMOR and they met a couple of times to see if they couldn't come up with an agreed paper. At this point,

NRO and DIA review(s) completed.

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[REDACTED]

Mr. McMillan said, apparently DIA was advised by Secretary Gilpatric that any views DIA put into the COMOR-NRO machinery should be submitted to him, Secretary Gilpatric, prior thereto for, apparently, DOD approval. Gilpatric left, and Secretary Vance took over, and there has been no progress in this field. The DIA paper, which was submitted to Fubini's office, namely to Augenstein, never came down from that office back to DIA or into any other portion of the machinery, and accordingly, DIA has had no authority to proceed. At this point, Fubini interjected and said that is not true, that is false. But McMillan countered by saying - well, he was still checking. At this point a parenthetical comment by me, it was subsequently brought out that Fubini had the papers in his hand and apparently his office had been hatching them throughout this entire period, although this admission was not clear-cut.

3. McCone said again that he felt that USIB was deficient, since they had not established requirements, and he felt that we must do it -- we, being USIB. He said that on 18 March Dr. McMillan had briefed USIB on new systems that covered several search systems -- some going halfway between the KH-4

25X1 [REDACTED] -- and he had mentioned, rather casually, [REDACTED]

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25X1 [REDACTED]

6. He pointed out that there were three things, then, that might be done -- and his problem was: do we go parallel or do we place priorities on these two? He said that all the new systems have serious technical problems which may foreclose any one of them.

25X1 [REDACTED]

NRO

He said all of these things must be explored before they can be accepted as a system for the expenditures of heavy money. He

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25X1 [ ]  
 said there was not enough money to take care of both of these approaches in the FY '65, although there might be some reapportionment activities within the FY '65 NRO tentative program if we really dug into it. He said, therefore, that USIB should express itself as to the input that was required for the intelligence inventory. Where should the major effort be placed? Should we keep CORONA as a search program and develop [ ] or should we go all out on [ ] for getting the swath width? He said we must answer all the imponderables of both systems just as quickly as we can through research and the proving of those still doubtful components, and then decide on one or the other, or on both.

25X1 [ ]

25X1 8. He said that he was in a dilemma, since he thinks we were negligent in not forcing the issue through the COMOR-NRO machinery. On the other hand, he said he didn't know what would be gained, because it was only two days ago that he had the slightest concept of what [ ] was, and it was only a month ago when [ ] started to settle down. So maybe really nothing would have been proven had we put this thing in writing.

9. At this point Fubini said, "Look, there is no fiscal ceiling on the NRO or on NRO research and development" -- if there is a good case presented which convinces the Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone, then he is sure that more funding will be possible. He said it's quite likely that we can carry on both programs simultaneously, if the proper case is made with Sec Def and DCI. He says what we have to know is what does USIB need and how well can you make the case in support of these needs. McMillan seemed to cast some doubt on this, because he said he was still torn and bleeding from the beatings he'd been getting from Mr. McNamara on money and savings, and so forth. Fubini then held up this stack of papers which he said were the papers from DIA and the NRO, and he said they could be extremely helpful, there was a great body of information in these papers, although he did not agree with some of it. These were obviously the papers I had referred to previously,

25X1 10. Fubini said two and a half years ago, Charyk had asked bids for a payload to be carried by the Titan 3 and weighing up to 20,000 pounds, capable of low orbit, and they had asked [ ] and [ ] and that subsequently all the copies of these proposals and bids had been burned at the direction of the Department of Defense, but he, Fubini, had a remarkable espionage system and he had a copy of all of these. He did not offer to provide them to anyone. This was designed for very broad coverage and a small resolution, [ ] He said

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[redacted]  
Eastman Kodak had another study, which they are now bringing up to date, which would appear to be [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] This was all that was mentioned at this point. What this might be, I don't know.

11. Mr. McCone said it is not the province of USIB or COMOR to say how the camera works, or what the machinery will be to acquire the necessary resolution or the necessary swath width. It is up to them to say what areas are of important priority interest, and to establish the needs for these acquisitions. He said he wanted NPIC to examine what we get on marginal resolution. For example, he said, we used the CORONA camera in the U-2 over Cuba and it really didn't help us any from the intelligence viewpoint, even though the resolution was considerably greater than the regular U-2 camera.

12. At this point, General Blake said he was greatly impressed by the weather limitations, and that while the present search may not give us enough resolution, reducing the swath coverage greatly increases the weather problem. I can see the relationship here. He said we must continue to broaden the coverage with the greatest resolution we can, and that really, because of weather and other factors, at times we seem to be doing our requirements work in somewhat of a vacuum.

13. McMillan said there had been considerable analysis of one factor - swath width - but in search we need continuous territorial coverage with a reasonable number of missions at a reasonable cost. He said what is the size of the area that must be examined in one picture? He said that there had been considerable analysis of the dimension of targets, that of the 600 targets they had been told to concentrate on, only two were larger than 50 miles in diameter, and that these were both missile complexes, that of all the rest 95% had a diameter of less than three miles -- so that we had to consider swath width versus economy. He said that in order to pick up all the targets by pointing -- and by this I think he meant spot pointing -- the operation gets very expensive. He said technical requirements imply the need for coverage of some breadth -- say search in a limited area something on the order of [redacted]  
[redacted]

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14. At this point, General Thomas said as far as they're concerned the Air Forces are still far from giving up either search or spot, and the Air Force says their technical intelligence requirements are [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Admiral Taylor said the Navy's stated technical requirement is [redacted]  
He also said that NPIC should be able to tell us what resolution we could reasonably settle for to meet the limits of both technical intelligence and any other types of intelligence. As a matter of fact, there are astro-physical limitations which you reach, I think, when you get in the neighborhood of [redacted] -- certainly by the time you get to [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

you are exceeding atmospheric limitations that you might expect.

15. McMillan said there has not been much experience with [REDACTED] resolution and we still had a lot to learn in this area. Mr. McCone said that there was really no limit to the demands for technical intelligence, that the intelligence guys would like to count every bolt and every nut in a piece of machinery. From the USIB viewpoint, on the other hand, in the broad look -- IRBMS's and so forth -- there is a lower limit past which resolution does not materially help, although [REDACTED] and so forth, could be helped greatly by greater resolution.

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[REDACTED]

with NRO inputs through the NRO membership and possibly Kiefer or others joining in. He hoped also -- looking directly at Fubini -- that DIA could reflect their views without DOD influence and delay and procrastination. Fubini felt that needle, I might add, right up to his navel.

18. Fubini says it has been his experience that it takes six to eight years to develop an operational airplane, and at least two and a half to three and a half years to develop an operational satellite with its payload. This would mean that there would be nothing in the inventory, at the earliest, before the end of 1966, which would be a new system, and that an interim capability by improvements could be done more timely. I think here he was probably looking ahead to [REDACTED] as brought out by the briefing yesterday.

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19. Mr. McCone agrees that we've got to get on with this right away, that we've got to provide NRO some programming guidance on the USIB requirements in the form of resolution and swath width, and particularly we

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[REDACTED]

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should start programming our current assets to cover our China requirements in the fall when the weather starts getting good. He felt sure that COMOR and NRO were on top of this, but he threw it in again as a reminder. McMillan said he would immediately look into the possible use of pulling some of our Lanyards out of the stockpile and cranking them up in a few months for the possibility of targeting of China. I then pointed out that after hearing Fubini's comments about the budget, I felt like the boy who was asked do you want chocolate ice cream or vanilla ice cream and he said I want both and lots of it.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

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*Copies sent to [REDACTED] -- as personal  
and Eyes Only document for their information -*


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22 July 1964 1648-1717 hours DDCI's Office

K1 DDCI, [REDACTED] Mr. Bross

DDCI: This is a brief of the executive session of USIB that took place today, Wednesday, July 22nd, at 11:50. Present were the regular members of USIB, plus Dr. McMillan of NRO, who is a member, for NRO matters, of USIB, and Dr. Fubini, who appeared at the request of Mr. McCone, because Dr. Fubini represents Secretary Vance and Mr. McNamara on NRO matters, and the responsibility for NRO is shared equally by DCI and the Secretary of Defense. I make a point of this because it explains why they were there and why the Director did not bring in his opposite member, the monitor of NRO, Dr. Wheelon, or why he did not have you, John Bross, or you <sup>Jim</sup> ~~Gene~~, or someone else. This was the membership. So the only true outsider was Fubini. Mr. McCone mentioned both of these points prior to making his opening remarks. He said the question that he was faced with was the establishment of requirements for overhead reconnaissance, and by requirements he referred not alone to targets that had to be covered, but the degree of resolution, and accordingly, therefore, the swath width, since they were related, and he felt that the U. S. Intelligence Board had perhaps been derelict in its duties over the years in not making these requirements clearly understood



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COMOR. In any event, all <sup>this is</sup> I'm doing is telling you now what Mr. McCone said at the meeting. [Don't correct me until we get all through.]

At this point, then, (Keefer), acting for McMillan -- and I am still quoting Mr. McCone -- got together with COMOR and they met a couple of times to see if they couldn't come up with an agreed paper. At this point, Mr. McMillan said, apparently DIA was advised by Secretary Gilpatric that any views DIA put into the COMOR-NRO machinery should be submitted to him, Secretary Gilpatric, prior thereto for, apparently, DOD approval. Gilpatric left, and Secretary Vance took over, and there has been no progress in this field. The DIA paper, which was submitted to Fubini's office, namely to Augenstein, never came down from that office back to DIA or into any other portion of the machinery, and accordingly DIA has had no authority to proceed. At this point Fubini interjected and said that is not true, that is false. But McMillan countered by saying - well, he was still checking. At this point a paranthetical comment by me, it was subsequently brought out that Fubini had the papers in his hand and apparently his office had been hatching them throughout this entire period, although this admission was not a clear-cut . . . . .

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He pointed out that there were three things, then, that might be done -- and his problem was: do we go parallel or do we place priorities on these two? He said that all the new systems have serious technical problems which may foreclose any one of them. For example, Eastman Kodak system depends on a very rapid new film speed -- they pointed out approximately 60% increase over present film speeds. Mr. McCone said

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there was a problem of stabilization of the vehicle, as well as greatly increased weight, as well as the size of the mirrors that were really a quantum jump in lens and mirror development. He said all of these things must be explored before they can be accepted as a system for the expenditures of heavy money. He said there was not enough money to take care of both of these approaches in the FY '65, although there might be some reapportionment activities within the FY '65 NRO tentative program if we really dug into it. He said, therefore, that USIB should express itself as to the input that was required for the intelligence inventory. Where should the major effort be placed? Should we keep Corona as a search  
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[ ] 25X

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On the other hand, he said he didn't know what would be gained, because it was only two days ago that he had the slightest concept of what [ ] was, and it was only a month ago when [ ] started to settle down. So really maybe/nothing would have been proven had we put this thing in writing.

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At this point Fubini, [ ] who had obviously been hatching something over there, [ ] said, "Look, there is no fiscal ceiling on the NRO or on NRO research and development" -- if there is a good case presented which convinces the Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone, then he is sure that more funding will be possible. He said it's quite likely that we can carry on both programs simultaneously, if the proper case is made with Sec Def and DCI. He says what we have to know is what does USIB need and how well can you make the case in support of these needs. McMillan seemed to cast some doubt on this, because he said he was still torn and bleeding from the beatings he'd been getting from Mr. McNamara on money and savings, and so forth. Fubini then held up this stack of papers which he said were the papers from DIA and the NRO, and he said they could be extremely helpful, there was a great body of information in these papers, although he did not agree with some of it. These were obviously the papers I had referred to previously.

Fubini said two and a half years<sup>240</sup> Charyk had asked bids for a payload to be carried by the Titan 3 and weighing up to 20,000 pounds,

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capable of low orbit, and they had asked [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and that subsequently all the copies of these proposals and bids had been burned at the direction of the Department of Defense, but he, Fubini, had a remarkable espionage system and he had a copy of all of these. He did not offer to provide them to anyone. This was designed for very broad coverage and a small resolution,

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enough resolution, reducing the swath coverage greatly increases the weather problem. I can see the relationship here. He said we must continue to broaden the coverage with the greatest resolution we can, and that really, because of weather and other factors, at times we seem to be doing our requirements work in somewhat of a vacuum.

McMillan said there had been considerable analysis of one factor - swath width - but in search we need continuous territorial coverage with a reasonable number of missions at a reasonable cost. He said what is the size of the area that must be examined in one picture? He said that there had been considerable analysis of the dimension of targets, that of the 600 targets they had been told to concentrate on, only two were larger than 50 miles in diameter, and that these were both missile complexes, that of all the rest 95% had a diameter of less than three miles -- so that we had to consider swath width versus economy. He said that in order to pick up all the targets by pointing -- and by this I think he meant spot pointing -- the operation gets very expensive. He said technical requirements imply the need for coverage of some breadth -- say search in a limited area something on the order of

[REDACTED]

At this point General Thomas said as far as they're concerned the Air Forces are still far from giving up either search or spot, and the

Air Force says their technical intelligence requirements are [ ] 25X

25X1 [ ] Admiral Taylor said the Navy's stated technical requirement


25X1 is [ ] He also said that NPIC should be able to tell us what resolution we could reasonably settle for to meet the limits of both technical intelligence and any other types of intelligence. As a matter of fact, there are astro-physical limitations which you reach, I think, when you get in the neighbor-

25X1 hood of [ ] -- certainly by the time you get to [ ] you are exceeding atmospheric limitations that you might expect. 25X1

McMillan said there has not been much experience with [ ] 25X  
resolution and we still had a lot to learn in this area. Mr. McCone said that there was really no limit to the <sup>demands</sup> [refineness) required] for technical intelligence, that the intelligence guys would like to count every bolt and every nut in a piece of machinery. From the USIB viewpoint, on the other hand, in the broad look -- IRMS's and so forth -- there is a lower limit past which resolution does not materially help, although [ ] and 25X  
so forth, could be helped greatly by greater resolution. 25X

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25X



to work on this at once, with NRO inputs through the NRO membership and possibly Keefer or others joining in. He hoped also -- looking directly at Fubini -- that DIA could reflect their views without DOD influence and delay and procrastination. Fubini felt that needle, I might add, right up to his navel.

Fubini says it has been his experience that it takes six to eight years to develop an operational airplane, and at least two and a half to

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three and a half years to develop an operational satellite with its payload. This would mean that there would be nothing in the inventory, at the earliest, before the end of 1966, which would be a new system, and that an interim capability by improvements could be done more timely. I think here he was probably looking ahead to  as brought out by the briefing yesterday.

25X1

Mr. McCone agrees that we've got to get on with this right away, that we've got to provide NRO some programming guidance on the USIB requirements in the form of resolution and swath width, and particularly we should start programming our current assets to cover our China requirements in the fall when the weather starts getting good. He felt sure that COMA and NRO were on top of this, but he threw it in again as a reminder. McMillan said he would immediately look into the possible use of pulling some of our Lanyards out of the stockpile and cranking them up in a few months for the possibility of targeting of China. I then pointed out that after hearing Fubini's comments about the budget, I felt like the boy who was asked do you want chocolate ice cream or vanilla ice cream and he said I want both and lots of it. [ And with this Mr. McCone told the story of the skipper of the carrier who had invited his wife and two children to come down and have lunch with them, and they came down in their car, and were met by ..... boys and the Executive Officer, and taken up to the captain's

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SECRET

wardroom area, and they sat down in plush chairs, and the Filipino boys came in and served them this and that and everything else, and then they were taken into this lovely dining room, with the sterling silver and the beautiful pictures and the lovely view out on the harbor, and were served this beautiful lunch, and everything was delightful, and they were escorted back down past the ....., and down the gangplank, and they got into this beat-up old Ford, and one little boy turned to his mother and said:

Mommie, why is it daddy's so rich and we're so poor? (Laughing) So that's about the meeting. That's the end of the Memorandum for the Record.

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1150

Dr MC mtr b4 for NRO

Tubini to repr SecDef as joint resp. of DCE/SecDef for NRO.

Q: Establisg reg. for Recon -

June 60 VB 18 to SecDef

"Intell Reg for Sat. Recon."

old paper -

"photo sys. capable of objct res. [redacted]"

25X

25X1

[redacted] - known 100' be  
utilized more extnd prbly -Apr 63 - VB 18 amendment update - asked  
COMOR2 to review reg, estab. new sub-  
guidance to DCE/SecDef for NRO -  
paper should be reviewed with NRO -Sept 63 - NRO expr. recommendations paper -  
Kufner & Connor met ~~personally~~ <sup>computerizing</sup> to get paper -  
Appears DIA was advised by Gelpatini that  
DIA should advise LR Reg. Sat Reg. to him -

Gelp left - Vance taken over -

No progress -

COMOR2 in bed with DIA -

DIA paper never come down from  
SecDef office (specifically Argueta) and has

F says not true -

MCM says still checking -

McCore says USIB experts since have not  
established req. -  
Reason must be -

18 Mar. Dr. MCM briefed USIB - new systems - 25X1  
covered several search systems - 1/2 first KH-4 ☐  
mentioned studies to ☐ - more 25X  
sophisticated & costly -



CIA give independently has details for design  
which if successful will give ☐ with  
Corona coverage - intriguing for quantum  
jump -



3 things that might be done -

All systems have serious tech. prob. with many  
 problems -

Speed of film

Stabilizer

weight

size of mirrors

All must be explored before can be  
 accepted as system for heavy money -

Not enough money to take both  
 in FY 65 - or a reposition

USIB should express best as to input  
 in inter. invention -

where major effort to be placed -

(1) Keep C as search and develop [ ]

25X

All out on [ ] - forgetting Smith

25X

(2) Answer all imponderable both systems as  
 quickly - research & approving of concepts.  
 Then decide one or both -

[ ] take 6 mo.

[ ] don't know, maybe not at all

DCI in debate - think we negligent in not  
 coming up - only 2 days ago I saw  
 [ ] month ago saw [ ] really

25X

K1  
 [ ] Not a Fiscal ceiling on  
 NRO R&D -  
 if good case, more is possible.

Can carry on both simult - if  
 case be made with SecDef & DCI -

What does USIB need - how well  
 can you make the case -

McMiller -

Bloody from McN beating on money -

K1  
 [ ] papers from DIA, NRO, etc. does  
 have body of info for USIB help -

2 1/2 yrs. ago. Chayk asked bids to  
 pay <sup>low order</sup> ~~20,000~~ <sup>1</sup> it's 3 payload -  
 all copies burned -

EK has another study - now bringing up  
 to date -

[ ]  
 broad coverage and and [ ]

MC - not province of USIB or COMOR as to how  
 camera works & all rest of it -

But what areas are of impr. priority interest.  
 establish need for both ??

on marginal resolution -

C camera over Cuba - didn't really help us from intel viewpoint -

Blake:

Improved by weather limitations.

Present search not enough resolution -

Reduced coverage increases weather problem -

Must continue to broaden coverage - we do our reg. work in vacuum -

NCM - some analysis of one factor - swaths -

Search - need continue terr. with res. no. vision - cost -

What is size of area that must be exam.

in 1 picture - dimension of targets - had been some analysis - 600 sq. only

2 - larger than 50 miles - minute coverage -


all rear, 95%, less than 3 mi. in diameter -

Swath width vs. economy - in order to pick up all targets by pointing, open gets expensive -

Tactical requirements imply need for coverage of some breadth - search in a limited area - say 50 miles as against 5 or 10 -


Thomas - still far from giving up either search or spot -

AF says tech intel requires



25X

Taylor says Navy needs




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NPIC should be able to tell us what resolution -


MCM - not much experience with 

25X1

MCC - No limit on fineness of res. req. for  
tech intell - every bolt -


From USIB view. IRBMs etc. There  
is lower limit past which resolution does  
not materially help - altho   
can be helped greatly -

25X1

25X1 Taylor -  I knows what he can get additional  
-

25X

Fub -



Fibeh supports high resolution for tech. intell -  
analysis of tactical forces - ground force tactical  
estimate plus tech intell. of armaments -

25X1



relatively high res. send system and

highly finite opor system -

Wants COMOR to ~~set~~ work on  
this at once - NRO to help -

hope DIA can reflect without DOD  
influence & delays

Taylor - need it now -

Fub - Airplane 6 - 8 yrs.

Sat. 2 1/2 - 3 1/2 yrs.

Nothing in inventory early end of 1966 -

Interim capability - more timely -

MCC - <sup>agrees</sup> NRO programming this way - need China  
in fall -

MCM - Use of lanyard ?? Targeting of China -

- Ribaldry about budgets -